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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
What’s Wrong is Wrisky: Moral Intuitions Bias Risk Perception 
 
By 
 
Daniel Relihan-Johnson 
 
Master of Arts in Social Ecology 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2018 
 
Professor Peter H. Ditto, Chair 
 
 
 
      While risk is a factual probability that can be calculated rationally, intuitive and affective 
motivations can bias risk information processing. Furthermore, research on moral coherence 
illustrates that factual beliefs of the world often falls in line with one’s moral intuitions. Research 
has yet to explore whether and how perceptions of risk morally cohere. I investigated how moral 
judgments influence perceptions of risk, such that people conflate what is morally wrong with 
what is risky. Study 1 examined morality and risk judgments of political threats and found that 
greater moral condemnation of each threat was associated with higher perceived likelihood of 
related physical harm. Based on prior research indicating that intention behind an action is an 
important component of how the action is judged morally (e.g., manslaughter versus murder), 
Study 2 manipulated moral judgments by varying the intentions of actions and found that 
participants judged intentional actions as more immoral and riskier than the same actions 
unintentionally committed. Study 3 further investigated the role of intention by manipulating 
actions to have good, ambiguous, or bad intentions, and found that, overall, bad intentioned 
actions were seen as more immoral and riskier than the same actions with good or ambiguous 
intentions, whereas good and ambiguous intentioned actions tended not to differ in moral and 
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risk judgments. Results provide initial evidence that moral judgments influence risk perception, 
such that perceptions of threat cohere along moral lines. These findings have implications for 
understanding risk assessment in political, legal, law enforcement, medical, and military 
contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Risk assessment is a process encountered multiple times a day, whether one is, for 
instance, driving in poor weather conditions, deciding if food is still good to eat, or choosing in 
which stocks to invest. The ubiquity of everyday risk management can even be seen in colloquial 
maxims, such as “it’s better to be safe than sorry”. However, although danger is real, risk 
assessment is inherently subjective and often socially constructed, For example, Americans are 
far more likely to die from transportation accidents (e.g., National Safety Council, 2018) than be 
murdered by an illegal immigrant (e.g., Nowrasteh, 2016), yet the 2018 Republican-led U.S. 
government proposed decreasing the budget for the Department of Transportation by about $2.4 
billion and increasing funding for a new wall along the Mexican border by $2.6 billion (Soffen & 
Lu, 2017). This shift in resource allocation followed a rise in populism within the Republican 
Party during the 2016 presidential election, which was characterized by a wave of anti-
immigration sentiment (Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Zakaria, 2016). Thus by elevating the threat status 
of illegal immigrants, Republicans were able to justify spending additional valuable resources on 
a lower level threat while reducing resources for a department that works to mitigate risks of a 
more probable threat. 
A second example can be found in state legislature proposed to limit transgendered 
individuals to using bathrooms of their biological sex. Republican partisans who supported these 
measures commonly argued that allowing transgendered women to use women’s restrooms 
would permit greater access for male sexual predators into female spaces (Steinmetz, 2015). 
Such arguments are reminiscent of when gay men were commonly stereotyped as being more 
likely to sexually prey on children (e.g., Lee, 2008), and are consistent with research correlating 
religiosity and conservatism with greater disgust and moral disapproval for sexual deviancy 
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(Brown & Henriquez, 2008; Crawford, Inbar, & Maloney, 2014; Lottes & Kuriloff, 1992; Herek, 
1988; Olatunji, 2008; Rosik, Dinges, & Saavedra, 2013; Shakelford & Besser, 2007; Whitley & 
Lee, 2000). Still, the adoption of the anti-trans bathroom bill led to greater costs than benefits. 
For instance, after passing state measure HB2 in North Carolina, the state tallied losses of over 
$5 billion and 1,800 jobs due to decreased federal funding, business investment, and tourism, and 
increased litigation and enforcement costs (Mallory & Sears, 2016). Thus, enacting affective and 
morally motivated policies due to increased threat perception resulted in greater economic losses 
than any gains in actual security and safety. 
Although such bias in threat perception is not solely limited to Republican partisans, 
these two examples illuminate how motivated reasoning in risk assessment can lead to 
detrimental policy and economic decisions. Although decades of research show that affect often 
drives risk perception (e.g., Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
2000; Fischoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2007; Slovic & Vastfjall, 2010), less is known about the role of morality. Given that 
moral reasoning relies on similar information processing as affect, the question remains as to 
whether moral judgments also drive perceptions of risk. To fill this gap in the literature, the 
present research aimed to better understand the correlational and causal relationship between 
moral judgments and risk perception. Investigating the relationship between morality and risk 
has important implications for potential under- and over-estimating risk across a variety of 
contexts, such as in political, legal, law enforcement, and military decision making. 
Information processing 
Mechanisms of judgment and decision-making are typically conceptualized through dual-
process models, which describe information processes of memory and attention as having both a 
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non-conscious, automatic mode (type 1 process), and a conscious, controlled mode (type 2 
process; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Early dual-process models, 
such as the heuristic-systematic model, primarily focused on the cognitive nature of information 
processing (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). For example, heuristic processing entails the use of heuristics 
(i.e., ‘mental shortcuts’ or judgment rules) that require minimal cognitive demands for a 
perceiver to process judgment-relevant cues. Although reliance on heuristics may be beneficial 
in that they require less cognitive resources and allow faster, simpler decision-making, they also 
lead to systematic and predictable errors (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Indeed, Kahneman and 
Tversky famously demonstrated a number of heuristics people rely upon when making 
judgments under uncertain conditions that lead to erroneous conclusions (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973, 1974), such as availability, representativeness, 
and anchoring and adjustment. In the context of risk perception, for instance, judgments about 
the probability of an event, such as the likelihood of a car accident, can be biased by the ease 
with which relevant events come to mind (i.e. availability; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), as well 
as by how similar or dissimilar its characteristics are to its related broader category of events 
(i.e., representativeness; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). However, despite the utility of early 
cognitive-focused process models such as the heuristic-systematic model and the elaboration 
likelihood model (ELM: Cacioppo & Petty, 1984), the role of affect and intuition in information 
processing was not fully addressed. As the field of psychology turned its focus to affective and 
intuitive motivations (i.e., the “affective revolution”), dual-process models were expanded (e.g., 
Epstein, 1994; Zajonc, 1980), allowing for an explanation of the underlying mechanisms behind 
motivated reasoning- a general trend for both conscious and nonconscious motivations to 
influence reasoning through cognitive and affective processes (Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Taber, 
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2005; Redlawski, 2002; Taber, Lodge, & Glathar, 2001; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009). Now 
called a variety of different names, including intuitive/analytic, implicit/explicit, 
emotional/intellectual, experiential/rational, hot/cold, type1/type2, and system1/system2, these 
two modal processes can interact and overlap, though they are distinct types of processing both 
psychologically (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kuhn, 2013; Stanovich 
& West, 2000; cf. Gigerenzer, 2011; Keren & Shul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; 
Osman, 2004) and physiologically (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). 
In dual-process models, Type 1 processing is characteristically defined as intuitive and 
autonomous (i.e., does not require working memory), though it is also often associated with 
processing that is fast, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, associative, emotional, and 
independent of cognitive ability (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 processing is hypothesized 
to be older evolutionarily, enabling humans to use emotion and intuition as information for 
making snap judgments in uncertain and adverse environments, which may provide accurate, 
though also inaccurate, bases for decision-making (Damasio, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For 
example, intuition, instinct, and gut feelings were likely relied upon to determine whether an 
animal was safe to approach, or if water was safe to drink (Evans, 2003; Slovic & Vastfjall, 
2010). Such reliance on intuition and emotion for decision making has been conceptualized a 
number of different ways, include the feelings-as-information hypothesis (Clore, Schwarz, & 
Conway, 1994; Frijda, 1988; Greifendeder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; 
Zajonc, 1980), affective rationality (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), intuitive 
hunch (Topolinski & Strack, 2009), gut feelings (Liebermann, 2000), emotion-based intuition 
(Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003), and the affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 
2007; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Slovic & Vastfjall, 2010). As life became 
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more complex throughout evolutionary development, humans increasingly gained control over 
their environment and mental analytic tools, such as logic and math, developed to boost the 
rationality of experiential thinking. This Type 2 processing is characterized by reflective and 
deliberative thinking (i.e., requires working memory), cognitive decoupling, and mental 
simulation. Type 2 processing is also characterized as slower, limited in capacity, conscious, 
abstract, controlled, rule-based, and reliant on cognitive ability (Evans, 2003; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Slovic & Vastfjall, 2010). The activation structure of these two processes 
remains under debate. For instance, parallel-competitive theories posit that both processes 
activate in parallel and each is implicated in processed information (Sloman, 1996; Barbey & 
Sloman, 2007). Default-interventionist theories, on the other hand, assume that fast Type 1 
processing is an intuitive default process upon which the reflective Type 2 process may or may 
not intervene (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Irrespective of their order of activation, the reviewed 
theoretical and empirical research suggests that information processed in judgment and decision-
making may incorporate motivating factors, such as emotion and intuition. Although these 
motivations may be beneficial in some contexts of survival, they also allow for the possibility of 
erroneous judgments. 
Motivated reasoning 
Despite motivations to be accurate in decision making (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), affect, 
emotion, and intuition from Type 1 processing can bias people’s preferences for specific 
judgment conclusions (Kunda, 1990; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2007). For 
example, people tend to perceive positive information about themselves as more valid than 
negative information about themselves (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, 
Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998; Wyer & Frey, 1983); and this extends to social attitudes where 
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evidence that supports one’s closely held attitudes and beliefs are more sought out, more 
favorably interpreted, found more compelling, and considered more valid than evidence 
challenging such beliefs and attitudes (e.g., confirmation bias; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 
2009; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; MacCoun, 1998; 
Munro & Ditto, 1997; Mynatt, Dohert, & Tweney, 1977; Nickerson, 1998). The mechanism 
through which one judgment conclusion may become preferred over another is by the association 
of judgment target characteristics with one’s affect response to the target. The hot cognition 
hypothesis, for instance, suggests that all sociopolitical concepts, such as people, groups, issues, 
and symbols, are affiliated with specific emotions (Lodge & Taber, 2005). This concept-emotion 
relationship becomes encoded in long-term memory, influencing subsequent evaluations and 
decisions (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Lodge & Taber, 2005; 
Rudolph, 2006), such as by seeking out and supporting one’s desired conclusions (Kunda, 1990). 
One type of motivated reasoning for which this can be found is moral reasoning, where moral 
judgments may be motivated by affect (Haidt, 2001) and moral principles are used to rationalize 
preferred moral conclusions (Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009). Hence, moral 
reasoning implicates Type 1 processing by relying on affect and intuition, which can lead to 
biased judgment outcomes. 
Moral intuitions 
Moral reasoning is theorized to have evolved to deal with the challenges of group living 
in increasingly complex social environments (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Fehr & 
Gachter, 2000; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2005; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2007) and 
appears to occur in a dual-process fashion. For instance, the social intuitionist approach posits 
that moral judgments rely on quick ‘gut feeling’ intuitions that are not always consciously 
 7 
 
accessible (i.e., Type 1 processing; Haidt, 2001). This approach was expanded upon by Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT), which has evidenced several innate and universally available 
psychological systems comprising the foundation of how people feel ethically, including harm-
care, fairness-cheating, loyalty-betrayal, authority-subversion, and sanctity-purity (Haidt, 2012; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Unique versions of morality are then created, 
differing within and between nations, by cultures constructing virtues and narratives atop these 
foundations (Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, & Ditto, 2012; Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009). For example, the MFT framework has aided in explaining differences in political 
values and perceptions: while liberals tend to show greater endorsement of foundations related to 
individual rights and autonomy, conservatives tend to endorse all five foundations equally 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and framing moral issues in terms of 
the five foundations influences political attitudes (Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014). The 
notion that moral judgments rely on intuitive gut-feeling foundations, and that political 
differences can be explained by differences in these intuitive gut-feelings, provides an 
explanation for the current increasingly extreme political climate in the U.S., whereby the 
inability to feel, rather than think, from others’ perspectives appears to be creating a red-blue 
moral empathy gap (Ditto & Koleva, 2011).  
Moral coherence 
Differences in how people morally feel can lead to divergences in how they reason about 
facts. For instance, there are two forms of moral reasoning through which an act’s morality is 
determined. While consequentialist reasoning tends to be more economically rational and 
emphasizes that an act is moral to the extent that it maximizes positive consequences (i.e., ends 
justify means), deontological reasoning centers on duties, or morally mandated sacred values, 
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that are considered absolute and ought to be protected from cost-benefit assessments (i.e., ends 
do not justify some means; Baron & Spranca, 1997; Liu & Ditto, 2012; Tetlock, 2003). Both 
types of reasoning may be used to maintain consistent perceptions of the world. Indeed, humans 
are inherently motivated to perceive their social worlds in a simple, organized, coherent manner 
(Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1947; Steele, 1988) and, in doing so, strive to reach a maximal internal 
consistency, or ‘coherence’, among their beliefs, feelings, preferences, goals, and actions 
(Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004; Thagard, 2002). This can be rationally achieved when 
making sense of information by adjusting conclusions to fit with factual knowledge, but also less 
rationally achieved by adjusting facts to fit with conclusions. Motivation to reach coherence in 
the moral domain is known as moral coherence, where people look to construct coherent, 
emotionally satisfying views of the world by bringing their descriptive understanding of it in line 
with their prescriptive frame of reference (Clark, Chen, & Ditto, 2015). In other words, when 
motivated to resolve the dissonance of a moral dilemma, factual information, such as an action’s 
costs and benefits, may be shaped in a post hoc reasoning process that conforms to deontological 
reasoning.  
This notion was supported in a series of studies by Liu and Ditto (2012). A classic social 
psychology paradigm is the footbridge moral dilemma, where a hypothetical group of workmen 
are stuck on a trolley track and can be saved by a runaway trolley if a large man standing on a 
bridge over the tracks is pushed off into the way of the train. This dilemma pits consequentialist 
reasoning, or sacrificing the life of one man to save several others, against deontological 
reasoning, which argues that it is wrong to sacrifice one life even if it saves many others. Liu and 
Ditto (2012) found in one study that participants who relied on deontological moral reasoning to 
solve the footbridge dilemma also saw the act of pushing the man off the bridge as less likely to 
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actually save the lives of the others, suggesting that how they morally reasoned about the action 
was related to their perceptions of the action’s effectiveness. The researchers replicated this 
finding using real-world moral dilemmas about forceful interrogations, condom protection, 
capital punishment, and stem cell research, and found that this relationship was stronger for 
participants with greater moral conviction about the issue, participants who felt more informed 
about the issue, and for political conservatives. Lastly, the researchers manipulated moral 
judgments by assigning participants to read persuasive deontological arguments either for or 
against the death penalty and found that not only did this produce changes in moral judgments of 
capital punishment, but also changed beliefs about its effectiveness. Participants who read anti-
capital punishment essays judged the death penalty as more deontologically immoral and 
expressed weaker beliefs in its ability to deter future crime, compared to the pro-capital 
punishment essay condition. The results of these studies suggest that descriptive knowledge, 
such as facts about costs and benefits, may be driven by motivation to see things in a morally 
coherent way. To extend this work, the present studies investigated the effect of moral judgments 
on a common type of cost-benefit fact that is frequently assessed across a number of contexts: 
the probability of a harmful outcome, or risk. 
Risk 
Subjective perceptions of risk often diverge from objective levels of danger. Traditional 
views conceptualized risk assessment as the objective quantification of probabilities and 
consequences of adverse events caused by physical and natural forces, whereby people rationally 
weigh costs and benefits in an analytical fashion (e.g., Mosteller & Nogee, 1951). More recent 
views define risk assessment as an inherently subjective process created to help humans manage 
danger and uncertainty (Slovic, 1999). For instance, there are a number of factors associated with 
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perceived risk such as race and sex (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000; Flynn, 
Slovic, & Mertz, 1994; Gustafsod, 1998; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007;Slovic, 
1999), social class (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015; Cote, 2011; 
Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson,  2011; Kish-Gephart, 2017; Piff, Stancato, Côté, 
Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, D., 2012), beliefs about hazards, (Fischoff, 1983; Fischoff, Slovic, 
& Lichtenstein, 1979, 1982; Slovic, 1987; Starr, 1969), prior experiences with negative life 
events (Blum, Silver, & Poulin, 2014), how risk information is framed (Combs & Slovic, 1979), 
numeracy (i.e., the ability to understand numbers; Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007; 
Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & Dickert, 2006) and affect (Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Gray & Ropeik, 2002; Lerner, Gonzalez, 
Small, & Fischoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Slovic, 1987).  
Although it may be socially desirable to think that one’s risk calculations are based on 
logic and reason, risk information tends to be processed using both system processes. Risk as 
feelings is characterized by quick, intuitive reactions to danger, such as in experiential system 1 
processing (Slovic & Vastfjall, 2010). For instance, Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and 
Combs (1978) showed that public perception and acceptance of risk for a variety of hazards were 
associated with feelings of dread. A subsequent study by Alhakami and Slovic (1994) found that 
perceived risks and benefits were linked to the strength of associated negative or positive affect, 
implying that participants judged risk, at least in part, by how they felt about it. If participants’ 
feelings toward an act were favorable, they tended to perceive risk as low and benefits as high, 
while feeling negative and unfavorably toward an act led to perceptions of higher risk and less 
benefits, thus relying on the affective heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2007).  Risk 
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as logic, on the other hand, relies on reason and deliberation to assess risk, as with Type 2 
processing (Slovic & Vastfjall, 2010). 
  A number of studies, including the ones just reviewed, indicate that affect can bias risk 
information processing. However, less is known about the extent to which morality might also 
influence perceptions of risk and threat. Initial work looking at how values shape factual beliefs 
showed that values of individualism versus egalitarianism are associated with risk-related beliefs 
(Braman & Kahan, 2006; Kahan, 2012; Kahan & Braman, 2006; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, 
& Mertz, 2007; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2007, 2009; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & 
Braman, 2011; Kahan, Wittlin, Peters, Slovic, Ouelette, Braman, & Mandel, 2011).  Studies by 
Liu and Ditto (2012) expanded this work by looking at the value-factual belief relationship in the 
context of moral dilemmas. The researchers found significant associations between descriptive 
cost-benefit beliefs and prescriptive moral opinions related to, and that this descriptive-
prescriptive relationship was stronger with greater political conservatism and moral conviction.  
Additionally, they found that reading essays about the inherent morality or immorality of capital 
punishment influenced participants’ beliefs about its ability to effectively deter crime. Taken 
together, the reviewed evidence suggests that moral judgments may be expected to drive 
perceptions of risk. 
Present Studies 
To build on this previous work, the present studies aimed to test the relationship between 
moral judgments and risk perception. I first sought to establish that there is a significant 
relationship between moral judgments and perceived risk, and began by investigating this 
relationship in a political context. Next, I looked to establish a causal relationship – that moral 
judgments drive risk perception, beginning outside of a political context. Drawing on prior 
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research findings indicating that actions that are attributed with more intention (e.g., Cushman, 
2008; Malle, 2006) and potential for harm (e.g., Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010) lead to more 
harsh moral judgments (Ditto, Liu, & Wojcik, 2012), I manipulated moral judgments by varying 
the intentions behind actions where participants provided moral judgments of the same actions 
that were either unintentionally or intentionally committed. To further understand the extent to 
which intention drives moral judgments and perceived risk of an action, I then manipulated 
actions to have either good, ambiguous, or bad intentions. Thus, I had three hypotheses in the 
present studies: 
H1: Moral judgments will be significantly associated with risk perceptions, such that the 
more immoral something is judged, the more risky it will be perceived. 
 H2: Actions committed intentionally will be judged more immoral and riskier than the  
same actions committed unintentionally. 
H3: Actions committed with bad intentions will be seen as more immoral and riskier 
compared to the same actions committed with good or ambiguous intentions, while good 
intentioned actions may or may not be seen as less risky than if they were done with 
ambiguous intentions. 
STUDY 1 
 Study 1 investigated whether there is a significant relation between moral judgments and 
perceived risk in a political context. I hypothesized that there would be a significant correlation 
between moral judgments and risk estimates for each of ten political threats. 
Method 
 Participants. Two-hundred and eighty-one southern California undergraduates were 
recruited for an online survey in exchange for course extra credit. Four participants were 
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excluded from analyses, three due to providing no responses to the survey items, and one for 
failing an attention check1 (MDuration = 1182s, SDDuration = 833.50s), leaving a final sample of 277 
(176 female; 82.54% 18-21 years old).  
Materials. Participants were presented with 10 political threats, one at a time, and in 
randomized order. To survey responses to a range of threats across the political spectrum, the 
political threats were created such that five were hypothesized to be found more immoral and 
threatening to conservatives (decision to end a pregnancy, restrictive gun laws, safe homosexual 
sex, crossing your country’s border illegally, and legalizing recreational marijuana), and five 
were hypothesized to be found more immoral and threatening by liberals (unlimited campaign 
contributions, nuclear energy, genetically modified food (GMOs), and using oil and coal for 
energy),with moderates fluctuating in-between. For each threat, participants provided moral 
judgments and risk estimates.2 
Moral Judgment. Participants rated the extent to which they found each threat justified 
or unjustified from 1(never justified) to 7(always justified) and moral or immoral from 1(very 
immoral) to 7 (very moral). Combining these two items for each threat showed moderate to 
excellent reliability, αRange = .65-.93, αMean = .78. Since averaging moral judgments across all ten 
threats for an overall moral judgment score did not have good reliability, α = .47, moral 
judgments for each threat were analyzed both separately and in aggregate. 
 Risk Estimates.  
                                                          
1 An attention check item was randomly included in each survey, asking participants to “please choose response 
option number three”. 
2 Participants also self-reported how they feel about each threat using a 7-point scale for six basic emotions, 
including anger, happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, and surprise, from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree). 
Results from this measure are not reported here, but may be used for future direction analyses. 
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Physical risk. The main dependent variable of interest was physical risk estimates, as 
these are technically calculable probabilities that are often represented numerically, such as in 
odds or percentages. Participants estimated the likelihood of a negative physical outcome related 
to each threat by using a slider bar from 0% (not likely at all) to 100% (completely likely) 
anchored at zero. These estimates measured general perceptions about physical risks specific to 
each threat. For example, the physical risk question for decision to end a pregnancy asked, “What 
is the likelihood that a woman who decides to end her pregnancy will have subsequent mental or 
physical health issues from it?”, and the physical risk question for genetically modified food 
asked, “What is the likelihood that consuming genetically modified food can cause physical 
health issues?” Hence, the physical risk questions were about people more generally, as opposed 
to a specific target e.g., the participant, an American, a hypothetical person), and sought to assess 
a broad perception of the likelihood of physical harm, related to each threat.  
For two threats, legalizing recreational marijuana and oil and coal energy use, two 
questions were asked to assess separate, but related types of physical risks. For example, the 
physical risk estimates for legalizing recreational marijuana comprised of the likelihood of 
physical harm to the smoker, and the likelihood that its use would lead to an increase in use of 
other drugs. These two items were combined for this threat’s physical risk estimate, α = .81. The 
physical risk estimates for oil and coal energy use were meant to measure broader physical risk 
assessment of climate change, which was the average of the likelihood that using oil and coal for 
energy can lead to global climate change, and the likelihood that global climate change can 
impact health, α = .76. All other threats had single physical risk estimates (see Appendix for full 
list of materials). Since averaging physical risk estimates across all ten threats did not have good 
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reliability, α = .37, physical risk estimates for each threat were analyzed both separately and in 
aggregate. 
Social risk. Though not a calculable probability, social risk, or potential for social harm, 
may also be related to moral judgments. As an exploratory measure, participants also estimated 
the likelihood of a negative social outcome related to each threat by using a slider bar from 0% 
(not likely at all) to 100% (completely likely) anchored at zero. The social risk questions 
measured general perceptions about social risks specific to each threat. Each threat’s social risk 
question started with, “What is the likelihood of being negatively evaluated by others for…”, and 
had an ending specific to the threat. For instance, the social risk question for decision to end a 
pregnancy asked, “What is the likelihood of being negatively evaluated by others for deciding to 
end a pregnancy?”, and the social risk question for genetically modified food asked, “What is 
the likelihood of being negatively evaluated by others for supporting genetically modified food?” 
Hence, the social risk questions were about people more generally, and sought to assess a broad 
perception of the likelihood of social harm related to each threat. There was only one social risk 
question per political threat, and even though averaging social risk estimates across all ten threats 
had moderate reliability, α = .68, social risk estimates for each threat were analyzed separately. 
Demographics. Lastly, participants completed several demographic questions including 
Income was measured in bins of $20,000 from $0 to $120,000 or higher. Social and economic 
political orientations were measured on a 7-point scale from 1(very conservative) to 7(very 
liberal). These two variables were reverse coded such that higher scores indicate greater 
conservatism. They were then averaged into political orientation composite, α =.73. To check 
that the stimuli were perceived difference by political partisans in morality and risk estimates, 
the political orientation composite variable was categorized such that scores below four were 
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grouped as liberals, scores equal to four were grouped as moderates, and score above four were 
grouped as conservatives. Religiosity was measured using one item that asked, “To what extent 
do you consider yourself religious?” and belief in god was measured using one item that asked, 
“To what extent do you believe in a god or gods?”, with responses to both being from 1(not at 
all) to 7(completely).  Participants also indicated their sex, ethnicity, political party affiliation, 
religious affiliation, and average daily number of hours spent using traditional (e.g., TV, radio) 
and social media. Age was used from a subject pool pre-screening battery completed before 
participating in the study (see Appendix for full demographic information). 
Results3 
 Stimulus check. Study 1 aimed to establish a significant relationship between moral 
judgments and risk perception. Descriptive statistics for political partisan moral judgments and 
risk estimates are presented in Table 1. With the exception of genetically modified food, moral 
judgments were in the hypothesized political partisan directions such that conservatives judged 
the five conservative threats more immoral than liberals, and liberals judged the liberal threats 
more immoral conservatives. Physical risk estimates were also in the expected directions, except 
for genetically modified food and American military operations overseas. Social risk estimates 
were generally mixed and did not appear in the expected political directions. 
Risk. The main hypothesis for Study 1 was that that there would be a significant 
correlation between moral judgments and risk estimates among political threats. To test this, 
Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted between moral judgment and physical risk 
estimate for each political threat. Moral judgments and physical risk estimate descriptive 
statistics are summarized in Table 2. For each of the ten political threats, moral judgment 
                                                          
3 R version 3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016) was used for all statistical analysis in this and subsequent studies. R code and 
data files are available from the first author upon request. 
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significantly correlated with physical risk estimate: decision to end a pregnancy, r(259) = .30, p 
< .001, 95%CI [.19,.41]4, restrictive gun laws, r(261) = .56, p < .001, 95%CI [.36,.55], safe 
homosexual sex, r(245) = .36, p < .001, 95%CI [.24, .46], crossing your country’s border 
illegally, r(253) = .41, p < .001, 95%CI [.30,.51], legalizing recreational marijuana, r(253) = .66, 
p < .001, 95%CI [.58,.73], unlimited political campaign contributions, r(256) = .43, p < .001, 
95%CI [.32,.52], nuclear energy use, r(264) = .60, p < .001, 95%CI [.52,.67], genetically 
modified food, r(255) = .55, p < .001, 95%CI [.46,.63], American military operations overseas, 
r(255) = .25, p < .001, 95%CI [.13,.36], oil and coal use for energy, r(250) = .31, p < .001, 
95%CI [.20, 42]. Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that moral judgment and 
risk perception are significantly associated. As exploratory analyses, moral judgments were 
correlated with social risk estimate for each threat using Pearson’s product-moment correlations. 
Results showed significant correlations for two of the threats, nuclear energy use, r(252) = .47, p 
< .001, and genetically modified food, r(237) = .27, p < .001 (Table 3), while the other eight 
threats had non-significant correlations between moral judgment and social risk estimate. 
To analyze the overall relationship between moral judgment and physical risk estimates, 
scores for these two variables were collapsed across the ten political threats. A Pearson product-
moment correlation between overall mean moral judgment and mean physical risk estimate 
indicated a significant association, r(181) = 37, p < .001, 95% CI[.24, .49] (Figure 1). To test 
whether this relationship holds above and beyond factors that may be related to moral judgments 
about political threats, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was conducted predicting 
overall physical risk estimate from moral judgment, controlling for gender, income, political 
orientation, ethnicity, religiosity, belief in a god or gods, and media use5. The overall model was 
                                                          
4 95% confidence intervals are presented in brackets. 
5 All continuous variables were standardized in this and all subsequent regression analyses. 
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significantly different from zero, R2 = .24, F(12, 165) = 4.38, p < .001, and supported the 
hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between moral judgment and risk estimate. 
Participants who judged the political threats as more immoral also estimated greater likelihood of 
related risk, β = .33, t(165) = 4.39, p < .001, 95%CI [.18,.48] (Table 4).  
Discussion 
Overall, results from Study 1 supported the hypothesis that moral judgments are 
significantly related to perceptions of risk. Across a range of different political threats, I found 
that the more participants judged the threat as immoral, the greater likelihood they estimated of a 
related negative outcome, and that this relationship held above and beyond factors related to 
morality and political threat perception. While there was strong evidence that this was the case 
for physical risk across the ten threats, there was weak evidence to support a significant 
association between moral judgments and social risk estimates. It is unclear why moral 
judgments might be related to physical but not social risk assessment. One possibility is the 
measure for assessing risk. For instance, physical risks are typically represented numerically, 
such as in odds and rates, while, social risks, such as the likelihood of being negatively judged by 
others, are not. By asking participants to estimate a risk in an unconventional way (i.e., social 
risk as a percent likelihood), the measure may have poor construct validity. A second and related 
possibility is that the physical risk questions were much more varied in wording and tailored to 
each threat specifically, while the social risk questions were more uniform across the threats. 
Hence, the lack of a correlation between moral judgment and social risk perception could be due 
to an issue with content validity. Follow-up studies will be necessary to further explore the 
morality of physical versus social risk perceptions and their measurements.  
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Study 1 had other limitations as well. For instance, the use of a college student sample 
mitigates the generalizability of the results, and results were only correlational. To investigate 
the causal relationship between morality and risk perception, and with a different sample, moral 
judgments were manipulated in Study 2 through an online data collection website. One way to 
manipulate moral judgments is to vary the mind perceived behind the judgment target. 
Conceptualized a number of different ways, including agency, intentionality, mentalizing, and 
perspective taking, the presence of a mind has repeatedly shown to be an important part of the 
degree to which people and actions are judged in moral terms (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; 
Chandler, Sokol, & Hallett, 2001; Cushman, 2008; Knobe, 2005; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, 
Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Killen & Smetana, 2009; Leslie,k Knobe, et al., 2006; Moran, 
Young, Saxe, Lee, O’Young, Mavros, & Gabrieli, 2011; Yuill & Perner, 1988; Zelazo, Helwig, 
& Lau, 1996). It is intention, for example, that differentiates manslaughter from murder in the 
American justice system, where the latter is considered a morally worse crime and for which the 
punishment may be attenuated if the mind behind the action is found to be unstable. Indeed, 
actions that are attributed with more intention (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Malle, 2006) lead to more 
harsh moral judgments (Ditto et al., 2012).  
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to test a causal relationship between moral judgments and risk perception. 
I hypothesized that manipulating an action to be done intentionally would lead to more moral 
condemnation and greater perceived risk related to the action compared to if it was done 
unintentionally, despite the effects of the action in both cases being the same. In other words, 
holding everything about an action constant (e.g., the actor, context, effect of the action) except 
the intention behind it, I anticipate people will find intentional actions more dangerous than if 
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they were unintentionally committed. The first was an indirect measure in which participants bet 
hypothetical money on the likelihood of a negative outcome related to each action. I 
hypothesized that the more immoral participants found the action to be, the more they would be 
willing to bet that a related negative outcome would occur. As in Study 1, risk was also assessed 
using a standard Likert scale. 
Method 
 Participants. Four-hundred and seventeen participants were recruited from the U.S. 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in exchange for $1, and using MTurk Prime 
features to prevent repeat participation. Seven participants were excluded from analysis for not 
providing responses to any survey questions, leaving a final sample of 410 (237 female; MAge = 
39.80, SDAge = 14.43).  
Materials. Participants were randomly assigned into one of two conditions. In the 
unintentional condition (n = 207), participants read three vignettes, each about a scenario in 
which an actor commits an action unintentionally. Participants in the intentional condition (n = 
203), read the same three vignettes, except that the actions were intentionally committed. The 
following vignettes were presented in random order: 
Flight vignette 
Kevin is in Las Vegas for the weekend for his best friend’s bachelor party. Scheduled to 
fly back home to his wife and kids on Sunday afternoon, Kevin leaves for the airport an 
hour and a half before his flight.   
Unintentional condition: However, on the way a car drives through a red light and hits 
his rental car, requiring him to file insurance and police reports to deal with the 
accident. His flight is domestic and on-time, he already checked in online, and he has 
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only 1 carry-on bag.  With 35 minutes until his flight departs, Kevin arrives at the 
airport. 
Intentional condition: However, on the way he decides to stop at a nearby casino for 
some last minute gambling. Losing track of time, he withdraws half of the funds from his 
kids’ college tuition account and loses it all in a few rounds of roulette.  
Quarter vignette 
Jason is at an amusement park and decides to go on the Freefall ride. Before he gets on, 
the staff ask all riders to remove loose items from their pockets.  
Unintentional condition: As the ride reaches the top, Jason doesn't realize he forgot to 
take a quarter out of his shirt pocket. The quarter flies out of his pocket as the ride drops. 
Intentional condition: As the ride reaches the top, Jason realizes there is a quarter in his 
shirt pocket. Thinking it would be funny to hit someone in the head, he throws the quarter 
out of his pocket as the ride drops. 
Expired food vignette 
Jasmine was invited to attend a company dinner party tonight with her co-workers and is 
running behind getting ready. Each employee was asked to bring their own dessert to 
share. After finding a recipe online, Jasmine decided to make a custard pie.  
Unintentional condition: While making the custard, she unknowingly used milk that is 
past its expiration date. She brings the pie with her and a few people eat it. 
Intentional condition: While making the custard, she noticed that the milk she used is past 
its expiration date. Since she doesn’t like her job and hates her co-workers, she brings 
the pie with her and does not tell anyone about the expired food. A few people eat it. 
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Risk question: What is the likelihood one of Jasmine’s co-workers who at the pie will get 
sick from it? 
 Moral Judgment. For each vignette, participants rated the extent to which the action was 
good or bad from 1(very good) to 7(very bad), justified or unjustified from 1(completely 
justified) to 7(never justified), and moral or immoral from 1(very moral) to 7(very immoral).  
Combining these three items for each of the vignettes showed good reliability, with Cronbach 
alpha coefficients ranging from .78 to .88. Averaging moral judgments across the three vignettes 
for each condition had good reliability for an overall composite moral judgment score, 
αUnintentional = .82, αIntentional = .88. 
Risk estimates. Risk was assessed using two different measures for each vignette. The 
first was a direct measure, using a 7-point scale assessing the likelihood of a negative outcome 
for each vignette from 1(very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). The risk estimate questions consisted 
of: flight vignette, “What is the likelihood Kevin will miss his flight?”, quarter vignette, “What is 
the likelihood someone walking by the Freefall ride will be hit by the quarter?”, and expired 
food vignette, “What is the likelihood that one of Jasmine’s co-workers who ate the pie will get 
sick from it”. Since combining risk estimates by condition did not show good reliability, 
αUnintentional = .31, αIntentional = .35, results are presented both by individual vignette and in 
aggregate. 
Risk was also assessed using indirect measure in the form of hypothetical betting. For 
each vignette, participants were prompted to “Imagine you are given $100 and a chance to bet” 
that a negative outcome would occur related to the action. If correct and the negative outcome 
occurs, the amount participants bet would double. If incorrect and the negative outcome does not 
occur, the amount participants bet would be lost. They were then asked “How much would you 
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be willing to bet? Please indicate a dollar ($) amount from 0 to 100”. For instance, the expired 
food vignette betting question stated,  
Imagine you are given $100 and a chance to bet that one of Jasmine’s co-workers will 
get sick from the expired food.  If you are correct and one of Jasmine's co-workers gets 
sick, the amount you bet will double. If you are incorrect and one of her co-workers does 
not get sick, the amount you bet will be lost. How much would you be willing to bet? 
Please indicate a dollar ($) amount from 0 to 100. 
Though combining the bet measure by condition showed to have good reliability, 
αUnintentional = .79, αIntentional = .85, results are presented both by individual vignette and in 
aggregate. 
Demographics. Lastly, participants completed several demographic items, including 
gender, age, ethnicity, income, social and economic political orientations, political party 
affiliation, and religious affiliation, religiosity, and belief in a god or gods, and social and 
traditional media use. Socioeconomic status was measured using the MacArthur Subjective 
Status Scale (Adler & Stewart, 200&0, which asks participants to place themselves on a ladder 
that represents society, with those at the top having the most money, education, and respected 
jobs, and those at the bottom having the least money, education, and respected jobs. Additional 
variables that were measured, but will not be reported here, include who they voted for in the 
2016 election, belief in karma, and belief in free will (see Appendix for full demographic 
information). 
Results 
 Manipulation check. As a manipulation check, an independent samples t-test was 
conducted comparing mean moral judgments between the unintentional and intentional 
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conditions. A summary of each vignette’s mean moral judgment is summarized in Table 4. For 
all three vignettes, the participants in the intentional condition judged the actions as more 
immoral than participants in who read about the actions being unintentionally committed, flight, 
t(395) = -18.92, p < .001, 95% CI[-2.51,-2.04], quarter, t(403) = -24.80, p < .001, 95% CI[-2.59,-
2.21], expired food, t(400) = -17.96, p < .001, 95% CI[-2.38,-1.91]. Collapsing moral judgment 
across the three vignettes by condition, participants in the intentional condition reported greater 
moral condemnation of the actions (M = 5.77, SD = .97) than did participants in the unintentional 
condition (M = 3.49, SD = .90), t(390) = -25.66, p < .001, 95% CI[-2.45, -2.10] (Figure 2). Thus, 
the moral manipulation worked for each vignette, and overall by condition. 
Risk. The main hypothesis for Study 2 was that intentional actions would be judged as 
more immoral and riskier than the same actions unintentionally committed. A summary of each 
vignette’s mean risk (likelihood) estimate is summarized in Table 5. For two of the three 
vignettes, perceived risk differed significantly such that intentional actions were seen as riskier 
than if they were unintentional, quarter, t(403) = -4.46, p < .001, 95% CI[-1.01,-.39], food, t(406) 
= -3.01, p = .008, 95% CI[-.83,-.17]. However, there was no significant difference in risk 
estimates for the third vignette, flight, t(405) = -1.16, p = .25, 95% CI[-.57,.15]. Collapsing mean 
likelihood scores across all three vignettes for each condition, results showed that there was a 
significant difference, such that participants who read vignettes suggesting that each risky action 
was done intentionally perceived a greater likelihood of related negative outcomes (M = 3.77, SD 
= 1.31) than did participants who read vignettes about the same risky behaviors enacted 
unintentionally (M = 3.29, SD = 1.23), t(403) = -4.26, p < .001, 95% CI[-.69,-.25] (Figure 2). 
Overall, risk estimates analyzed individually and in aggregate supported the hypothesis that 
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intentional actions are not only seen as more morally bad, but also riskier than the same actions 
unintentionally committed. 
Risk was also measured indirectly using a hypothetical betting scenario for each vignette. 
Mean bet amount per vignette and condition are summarized in Table 5. Independent samples t-
tests indicated that participants did not differ in the amount that they bet between conditions for 
any of the three vignettes. Collapsing mean dollar amount bet across all three vignettes, results 
showed that there was no significant difference in amount bet between the intentional (M = 5.90, 
SD = 6.32) and unintentional (M = 5.89, SD = 6.25) conditions, t(818) = -.84, p = .97, 95% CI[-
.84, .80]. Thus, results from the betting measure did not support the hypothesis. 
Discussion 
 Results from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that moral judgments influences 
perceptions of risk. Three actions were manipulated to be unintentionally or intentionally 
committed, and this manipulation successfully created differences in the actions’ moral 
judgments such that intentional actions were more morally condemned. The manipulation also 
produced significant differences in risk associated with the actions, suggesting that differences in 
moral judgments lead to differences in perceived risk. The exception was the flight vignette, 
where a man arrives to an airport with 35 minutes before his flight departs. One reason this 
vignette may not have worked is that asking participants to calculate timing (e.g., thinking about 
how long security lines take, plus how long to get to the gate, etc.) could have induced more 
analytic thinking, thus relying less on how they morally feel about his prior action. Another 
possibility is that 35 minutes to get through airport security to a gate in this scenario may 
inherently be unlikely, regardless of any prior action. If he had 45 minutes instead, might the 
morality of his prior action make him seem more likely to miss his flight? This raises a potential 
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boundary condition of the effect of morality on risk assessment - actions that are obviously 
highly likely to happen may not be influenced by moral judgments. 
 As an exploratory measure, risk was also assessed indirectly using a betting scenario in 
which participants were expected to bet more money on the likelihood of a negative outcome the 
more morally bad they judged an action. A likely reason this measure did not work is that it is 
hypothetical, and thus, participants might not be motivated enough to respond how they truly 
would otherwise. It is also possible that, similar to calculating time, asking participants to 
calculate money for scenarios with different outcomes (i.e., in one case their money would 
double, in another, they would lose their money) induces analytical thinking, thus participants 
may rely less on moral intuitions to guide their judgment. Additional studies could use real 
money betting scenarios to see if moral judgments influence risk-based bets when participants 
have actual stakes in the bet, and investigate how risk calculations involving time and money 
might evoke analytical thinking that is less prone to influence from moral feelings. 
 Study 2 was also limited in two additional ways. First, while MTurk provides better 
generalizability than a student sample, it is important to test this effect across multiple samples to 
establish its robustness. Second, comparison of unintentional to intentional actions does not 
provide the ability to distinguish directionality between good and bad intentions. For instance, it 
is unclear whether good intentioned actions are seen as less risky, bad intentions are seen as 
more risky, or both, compared to a neutral action in which the intention is unknown. Study 3 
aimed to examine this comparison using a different online sample. 
Study 3 
 Study 2 provided evidence that intentional actions are seen as more immoral and riskier 
than if they are unintentionally committed. However, it is still unclear whether good intentions 
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might be decreasing perceived risk, or bad intentions increasing perceived risk. To test this, I 
manipulated actions to have either good, ambiguous, or bad intentions. Risk was assessed using 
the same slider bar from Study 1. I hypothesized that bad intentioned actions would increase 
perceived risk, and I was agnostic as to whether or not good intentions would decrease risk 
perception, compared to an ambiguous intention condition. 
Method 
Participants. Five-hundred and ninety-five participants (346 Male; MAge = 35.17, SDAge 
= 15.76) were recruited from YourMorals.org (YM). YM is a data collection website in which 
visitors are invited to participate in a number of different studies about morality and ideology, 
and are given feedback on their responses. Visitors typically find YM by typing keywords 
related to morality into search engines, or through publicly disseminated psychological research.  
Materials. Participants were presented with six vignettes about apolitical actions. For 
each vignette, participants were randomly assigned to read about the action as having a good, 
ambiguous, or bad intention. Thus, the vignette conditions were presented within-subjects, such 
that participants could be randomly assigned to any of the three conditions for each vignette. 
Vignettes were presented in randomized order to mitigate the potential for ordering effects. 
However, there is still a potential for dependency of responses between conditions for a given 
vignette. For instance, since it is possible for a participant to provide moral and risk judgments 
for the good intention condition of one vignette and bad intention condition of another vignette, 
responses to the latter vignette may be considered dependent on responses to the former. Hence, 
between-condition moral and risk judgment results were analyzed separately for each condition, 
though it is important to note that dependency between vignettes may exist, despite the fact that 
each vignette is a different contextual scenario.  Two of the vignettes were adopted from Study 2, 
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in order to replicate the previous found effects, namely the quarter and expired food scenarios. 
Four vignettes were new and consisted of actions related to medicine, a broken car, driving 
through yellow lights, and crossing train tracks. For example, participants read (see Appendix for 
a full list of the vignettes):  
Medicine vignette 
 Good intention condition: Jane has a chronic illness. At her most recent visit to  
her doctor, Jane was prescribed a new drug that is still in clinical trials and has 
unknown side effects. The doctor wrote the prescription because he thinks it is the 
best option for her. 
Ambiguous intention condition: Jane has a chronic illness. At her most recent 
visit to her doctor, Jane was prescribed a new drug that is still in clinical trials 
and has unknown side effects. 
Bad intention condition: Jane has a chronic illness. At her most recent visit to her 
doctor, Jane was prescribed a new drug that is still in clinical trials and has 
unknown side effects. The doctor wrote the prescription because he thinks it will 
win him favor for an executive position at the drug’s company. 
Risk question: What is the likelihood Jane will have an adverse reaction to the 
new drug? 
 Yellow light vignette 
  Good intention condition: After getting off work, John realizes that he left his  
wife’s unwrapped anniversary present on the kitchen table at home. Rushing to 
get there before his wife does, he drives through multiple yellow lights on the way. 
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Ambiguous intention condition: After getting off work, John rushes to get home 
and drives through multiple yellow lights on the way. 
Bad intention condition: After getting off work, John realizes that he left his bag 
of cocaine on the kitchen table at home. Rushing to get there before his wife and 
kids do, he drives through multiple yellow lights on the way. 
Risk question: What is the likelihood John will be in a car accident on his way 
home? 
 Moral Judgment. Participants rated the extent to which they found each action justified 
or unjustified from 1(always justified) to 7(never justified) and moral or immoral from 1(very 
immoral) to 7 (very moral).  Combining these two items for each vignette showed moderate to 
excellent reliability, αRange = .69-.93, αMean = .82. 
Risk estimates. Participants estimated the general likelihood of a negative outcome for 
each action by using a slider bar from 0% (not likely at all) to 100% (completely likely) anchored 
at zero. 
Demographics. Demographic information including sex, age, education level, 
socioeconomic status, and political orientation were collected before participation in the study as 
part of registering with YM. In addition to these variables, participants indicated at the end of the 
study their religiosity, belief in a god or gods, and average daily number of hours spent using 
traditional (e.g., TV, radio) and social media (see Appendix for full demographic information). 
Results 
 Manipulation check. To test whether the moral manipulation was successful, a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each vignette with intention as a three-level 
independent variable (good, ambiguous, bad) and moral judgment as the dependent variable. 
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Mean moral judgment scores for each condition across vignettes are illustrated in Figure 3. 
Results showed that all six ANOVAs were significant, Fs = 6.22-415, ps < .003 (Table 6). Tukey 
HSD post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that for all six vignettes, participants judged 
actions as more immoral when they were committed with bad intentions compared to when they 
committed with good intentions. Furthermore, moral judgments of actions with bad intentions 
were judged as significantly more immoral than when the actions were committed with 
ambiguous intentions for five of the six vignettes. The one vignette for which there was no 
difference in moral judgments between bad and ambiguous intention versions of the action was 
the yellow light vignette, where a man who just got off work speeds home through multiple 
yellow lights to either hide his wife’s anniversary present before she gets home (good intention), 
no explanation is given for why he rushes home after work (ambiguous intention), or he speeds 
home to hide his cocaine from his wife and kids before they get home (bad intention). Moral 
judgments of actions with good versus ambiguous intentions significantly differed for three of 
the six vignettes (broken car, yellow light, quarter). 
For example, the quarter vignette replicated the moral manipulation from Study 2, F(2, 
571) = 415, p < .001, where participants judged throwing a quarter off an amusement park ride 
with the intention of hitting someone as more morally bad (bad intention; M  = 6.17, SD = .93) 
than if the actor tried, but failed, to prevent the quarter from flying off the ride, (good intention; 
M = 2.91, SD = 1.37), p < .001, and if the quarter was flung from the ride unknowingly 
(ambiguous intention; M = 3.73, SD = .99), p < .001, while good and ambiguous intention 
conditions also significantly differed in moral judgment, p <. 001. The expired food vignette also 
replicated the moral manipulation from Study 2, F(2, 578) = 87.11, p < .001, where participants 
judged knowingly serving expired food to co-workers without telling them was seen as more 
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morally bad (M = 5.63, SD = 1.05) than if the food was served knowing it is expired, but 
providing co-workers with a forewarning about it  (M = 4.23, SD = 1.33), p < .001, and if the 
food was served without knowing it was expired (M = 3.99, SD = 1.38), p < .001. Thus, across 
the six vignettes, varying the intention behind actions successfully manipulated moral judgments 
of the action, with clear differences between bad and good intentions, and bad and ambiguous 
intentions, but less clear differences between good and ambiguous intentions. 
 Risk. The main hypothesis for Study 3 stated that bad intentioned actions would increase 
risk estimates relative to the same actions done with good and ambiguous intentions, and I was 
agnostic as to whether good intentions would decrease risk estimates compared to an ambiguous 
intentions. Mean risk estimates for each condition across vignettes are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Results showed that four of the six ANOVAs were significant (medicine, expired food, yellow 
light, quarter), and one was trending toward significance (broken car; see Table 7). Tukey HSD 
post-hoc contrasts indicated that participants’ risk estimates of the bad intentioned actions 
significantly differed from good intentions for three of the six vignettes (medicine, expired food, 
quarter), and was trending in difference for two other vignettes (broken car, yellow light). 
Compared to ambiguous intentions, participants who read about the actions as having bad 
intentions estimated greater likelihood of negative outcomes for three of the six vignettes 
(medicine, yellow light, quarter), while risk estimates for the good intention versions of the 
actions did not significantly differ from ambiguous intention for any of the vignettes. This 
supports the hypothesis that, compared to ambiguous intentions, bad intentions seem to be 
increasing risk associated with an action rather than good intention behind the action decreasing 
risk perception. 
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 For example, the quarter vignette replicated the risk estimate pattern from Study 2, F(2, 
576) = 13.93, p < .001, where participants judged the likelihood of someone walking by an 
amusement park ride being hit by a quarter as more likely if the quarter was intentionally flung 
off the ride (bad intention; M  = 27.54, SD = 25.89), than if the actor tried, but failed, to prevent 
the quarter from flying off the ride, (good intention; M = 16.76, SD = 20.29), p < .001, and if the 
quarter was accidentally thrown off the ride unknowingly (ambiguous intention; M = 17.02, SD 
= 20.62), p < .001. There was no difference, however, in participants’ risk estimates between the 
quarter flying off the ride with a good versus ambiguous intention.  
The expired food vignette somewhat replicated the risk estimates from Study 2, F(2, 579) 
= 4.38, p = .013. Participants’ risk estimates of eating expired food that was intentionally served 
without forewarning (bad intention; M = 27.91, SD = 25.67) were significantly different from if 
the expired food was served, but a forewarning was given (good intention; M = 20.72, SD = 
21.86), p < .001, but were not significantly different from if the expired food was unknowingly 
served (ambiguous intention; M = 25.09, SD = 25.62), p = .51.  For a summary of ANOVA 
results for each vignette, see Table 7.  
Discussion 
In sum, moral judgments and risk estimates were trending in the expected direction for all 
six actions (as seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively), and ANOVA results generally 
supported the hypothesis that participants’ moral condemnation and risk estimates increased 
when reading about actions with bad intentions more so than moral and risk judgments decreased 
when reading about the same actions with good intentions, relative to when the actions were 
committed with ambiguous intentions. Indeed, while there were mixed results as far as 
significant risk estimate differences between bad and ambiguous, and bad and good intentioned 
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actions, none of the risk estimates significantly between good and ambiguous intentioned 
actions. 
Even though the moral manipulation worked for each vignette, there were two with 
trending significant differences in risk estimates and one that was completely non-significant. 
One possibility for these mixed results is the idiosyncratic nature of the vignettes. The scenarios 
widely differed in context, such as the actor demographics (e.g., gender, societal role), action 
type (e.g., eating, speeding), and who the risk was to (e.g., the actor versus someone else). It may 
be that the effect size of the influence of moral judgment on risk perception is different 
depending on context, thus the present study may have been underpowered to detect this effect in 
some contexts, but sufficiently powered for others. It is also possible that there were 
characteristics unique to the vignettes with trending and non-significant risk estimates 
differences. For instance, while the five vignettes that were significant or trending in risk 
estimate differences consisted of risks that could cause harm, but not necessarily immediate 
death, the one vignette that did not have significant risk estimate differences consisted of a risk 
that could result in immediate death (i.e., being hit by a train). Similar to the non-significant risk 
estimate difference found in Study 2’s flight vignette, it is possible that risks with obvious, or 
already highly-anchored notions of riskiness, are less influenced by the morality of related 
actions. Future studies could control characteristics of the situation, such as about the actor and 
whether the risk is to the actor, the perceiver, or a third party, as well as more directly investigate 
the effect of moral judgment and different types of risks, to better understand what factors 
moderate the morality – risk relationship. 
Lastly, Study 3 was limited by the complexity of its design. Participants were shown all 
six vignettes, and randomly assigned to an intention condition for each one. This was done to be 
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efficient with statistical power in testing the effect of morality on risk perception across a variety 
of contexts. By randomizing the ordering of the vignettes, differences across participants would 
be dispersed such that results should not be an artifact of vignette ordering. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that responses to one condition in any given vignette are dependent on responses to a 
different condition in any other vignette. To verify that the present results are not due to 
dependency based on vignette ordering, a follow-up study is planned to replicate these results 
strictly between subjects. 
General Discussion 
Theoretical Considerations 
 Prior research has found risk information processing can be biased by how people feel 
about such risks (Slovic & Vastfjall, 2010) and that differences in perceptions of risk are 
associated with differences in cultural values (Kahan, 2012). Less is known, however, about how 
moral judgments drive risk assessment. The notion of moral coherence, or the aligning of factual 
knowledge with how one morally feels about the world to achieve cognitive consistency, 
suggests that the inherent cost-benefit nature of risk perception is one such fact that may be 
brought in line with one’s prescriptive frame of reference (Clark et al., 2015). Initial research by 
Liu & Ditto (2012) found using, both artificial and real-world moral dilemmas, that acts judged 
as immoral were also perceived as less likely to produce benefits and more likely to engender 
harmful costs, and that this relationship was stronger with greater moral conviction, self-reported 
knowledge of the issue, and political conservatism.  In manipulating the framing of the death 
penalty, they found a causal relationship between moral judgements and cost-benefit beliefs such 
that participants who read essays about the inherent immorality of capital punishment perceived 
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it as having less benefits and greater costs than participants who read a pro-capital punishment 
essay. 
Building on this research, I investigated the correlational and causational relationship 
between moral judgments and perceived risk. Study 1 aimed to establish a significant correlation 
between moral judgments and risk estimates in a political context. Using an undergraduate 
student sample, results from Study 1 found that the more participants morally condemned 
political threats, including abortion, illegal immigration, unlimited political campaign 
contributions, and nuclear energy, the more they estimated the likelihood of a negative harmful 
outcome related to the threat. Multiple regression analysis further showed that the overall 
relationship between moral judgments and physical risk estimates persisted beyond demographic 
variables and factors related to moral judgment and political threat perception, such as political 
orientation, religiosity, and media use. However, while the morality-risk relationship appeared to 
be strong for estimates about physically harmful outcomes, correlations were weak for estimates 
about socially harmful outcomes.  
To improve generalizability and establish a causal relationship, Study 2 aimed to test the 
effect of moral judgments on risk perception with a different sample. Based on previous research 
indicating that intention is an important aspect in judging people and actions in moral terms 
(Cushman, 2008; Dito et al., 2012; Malle, 2006), moral judgments were manipulated in Study 2 
by varying whether actions were unintentionally or intentionally committed. Results indicated 
that the same actions were judged as more immoral and riskier when they were committed 
intentionally, then if they were committed unintentionally. Although this result supports the 
notion that moral judgments influence perceived risk, the extent to which bad intentions increase 
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moral condemnation and risk perception versus good intentions decreasing moral condemnation 
and risk perception remained unclear.  
To further examine this difference, as well as extend the generalizability of this effect 
beyond undergraduates and MTurk workers, actions were manipulated to have good, ambiguous, 
or bad intentions in Study 3. Using an online sample from the data collection website 
YourMorals.org, results indicated that the moral manipulation worked, such that participants 
judged actions with bad intentions as more morally bad than when they had ambiguous and good 
intentions, while differences in moral judgment between good and ambiguous intentioned 
versions of the actions were mixed. Overall, risk estimates generally supported the notion that 
bad intentions behind an action increase perceived risk more so than good intentions decrease 
perceived risk, compared to ambiguous intentions. This was evidenced by significantly higher 
risk estimates for actions with bad, compared to ambiguous and good, intentions in three of the 
six vignettes, and trending differences in two additional vignettes. Meanwhile, participants’ risk 
estimates did not differ between good and ambiguous intention versions of the actions for any of 
the vignettes. Taken together, results from these three studies replicate the associations and effect 
found by Liu and Ditto (2012), and further support the premise that risk perceptions cohere in a 
moral fashion. 
Practical Considerations 
 Risk assessment is implicated throughout numerous everyday judgments, from taking 
medications and eating expired food to reaching legal verdicts and supporting political policies. 
Indeed, the socially constructed nature of risk perception leads to polarized ideological views and 
controversy over what constitutes risk, when, and what order of actions are needed as a solution 
(Slovic, 1992, 1999). Controlling the definition of what is risky for the broader population 
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provides an individual or group with power over the ways with which resources are used to 
mitigate such risks. This was illustrated in the beginning examples where political leaders 
enacted policies based on heightened, but irrational, threat perceptions that ultimately turned out 
to be economically detrimental. Given that illegal immigration and sexual deviancy tend to strike 
a moral chord with conservatives (Brown & Henriquez, 2008; Crawford, Inbar, & Maloney, 
2014; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Herek, 1988; Olatunji, 2008; Rosik, Dinges, & Saavedra, 
2013; Shakelford & Besser, 2007; Whitley & Lee, 2000), it is possible that what the politicians 
found morally wrong lead them to be afraid of the wrong things. Results from the present studies 
support this explanation by finding that participants tended to conflate what they judged as 
morally bad with what they estimated to be risky. 
 
Future Directions 
 The association between moral judgment and risk assessment was found to be significant 
across a range of political threats, everyday behaviors, and contexts. The robustness of this effect 
is further evidenced by the use of different samples. Since any single sample is limited in its 
generalizability, the present studies utilized undergraduate, MTurk, and YM samples, finding 
significant associations and effects in each. Risk was also measured a few ways, including a 
sliding bar indicating a percent likelihood, a 7-point Likert scale, and through betting money, 
though the latter measure did not produce significant results. Future studies can extend this 
research by continuing to use different samples (e.g., jury, military personnel, law enforcement, 
general public), manipulations of morality (e.g., priming), risk measures (e.g., behavioral, 
prioritizing list of threats), and more ecologically valid contexts, such as in assessing threats to 
national security. Lastly, given the major political and economic implications of morality 
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influencing risk perception, it will be important for future studies to investigate how to intervene 
to prevent such detrimental outcomes. For instance, some research indicates that moral intuitions 
can be overridden by Type 2 processes (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010; Feinberg, 
Willer, Antonenko, & John, 2012; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; 
Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2012; Lee, 
Sohn, & Fowler, 2013). Investigating whether emotion-regulation strategies, or other ways of 
inducing analytical thinking, reduces the effect of  moral judgment on perceive risk might be a 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Study 1 descriptive statistics of moral judgment and risk estimates for each political threat by participant political 
orientation (liberal n = 159, moderate n = 72, conservative n = 44)a 
 
 
Political 
Threat 
Mean Moral Judgments 
(SD) Mean Physical Risk Estimate (SD) Mean Social Risk Estimate (SD) 
Lib. Mod. Con. Lib. Mod. Con. Lib. Mod. Con. 
Decision to 
end a 
pregnancy 
 
3.26 
(1.53) 
3.89 
(1.47) 
4.38 
(1.89) 
53.04 
(26.34) 
61.42 
(25.46) 
63.88 
(25.41) 
76.26 
(18.45) 
77.25 
(16.62) 
80.21 
(17.03) 
Restrictive 
gun laws 
 
2.69 
(1.39) 
3.13 
(1.40) 
3.82 
(1.68) 
46.02 
(31.20) 
46.40 
(28.55) 
59.14 
(25.85) 
51.68 
(24.66) 
52.56 
(23.26) 
56.07 
(25.75) 
Safe 
homosexua
l sex 
 
2.09 
(1.40) 
3.01 
(1.57) 
3.88 
(2.27) 
31.81 
(26.22) 
41.65 
(23.69) 
42.73 
(30.22) 
61.33 
(27.26) 
63.26 
(21.44) 
62.60 
(22.64) 
Crossing 
your 
country’s 
border 
illegally 
 
3.49 
(1.43) 
3.95 
(1.42) 
4.36 
(1.54) 
27.95 
(21.92) 
46.84 
(23.71) 
37.66 
(21.81) 
64.64 
(24.19) 
68.25 
(21.56) 
63.55 
(24.38) 
Legalizing 
recreationa
l marijuana 
 
3.49 
(1.43) 
3.95 
(1.42) 
4.36 
(1.54) 
27.95 
(21.92) 
37.66 
(23.71) 
46.84 
(21.81) 
64.64 
(24.19) 
68.25 
(21.56) 
63.55 
(24.38) 
Unlimited 
campaign 
contributio
ns 
 
5.07 
(1.30) 
4.54 
(1.14) 
4.51 
(1.27) 
71.82 
(23.75) 
65.00 
(19.50) 
65.50 
(21.99) 
60.93 
(22.31) 
58.80 
(20.61) 
61.88 
(21.68) 
Nuclear 
energy use 
 
4.55 
(1.45) 
4.33 
(1.32) 
4.11 
(1.45) 
72.64 
(26.27) 
75.46 
(22.93) 
67.40 
(25.30) 
61.84 
(23.41) 
59.78 
(25.68) 
58.48 
(24.76) 
Genetically 
modified 
food 
 
4.17 
(1.47) 
4.38 
(1.05) 
4.38 
(1.34) 
63.56 
(25.54) 
68.54 
(22.68) 
66.98 
(25.34) 
53.98 
(24.31) 
54.10 
(20.51) 
56.00 
(21.82) 
American 
military 
operations 
overseas 
 
4.48 
(1.24) 
3.81 
(1.25) 
3.74 
(1.20) 
65.68 
(23.63) 
68.12 
(17.73) 
65.90 
(21.44) 
51.96 
(25.15) 
53.39 
(24.01) 
46.54 
(25.81) 
Oil and 
coal energy 
use 
4.31 
(1.20) 
3.59 
(1.08) 
3.71 
(1.05) 
82.01 
(16.91) 
71.87 
(15.67) 
74.52 
(16.56) 
52.39 
(27.41) 
48.27 
(22.34) 
57.18 
(22.23) 
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aNumbers vary from total sample size due to missing data; The first five political threats were hypothesized to be found 
more immoral and threatening to conservatives, and the last five threats were hypothesized to be more immoral threatening 
to liberals.; Lib. = liberal, Mod. 
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Table 2. Study 1 descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between composite moral 
judgment and physical risk estimate for each political threat. 
Political Threat 
Mean Moral 
Judgments 
(SD) 
Mean Physical 
Risk Estimate 
(SD) 
r 
95% Confidence Intervals 
Lower Limit Upper Limit 
Decision to end 
a pregnancy 
 
3.62 (1.85) 56.96 (29.43) .30*** .19 .41 
Restrictive gun 
laws 
 
3.00 (1.67) 48.38 (32.61) .46*** .36 .55 
Safe 
homosexual sex 
 
2.62 (1.86) 36.02 (30.32) .36*** .24 .46 
Crossing your 
country’s 
border illegally 
 
3.76 (1.65) 34.12 (26.71) .41*** .30 .51 
Legalizing 
recreational 
marijuana 
 
3.35 (1.90) 49.22 (30.70) .66*** .58 .72 
Unlimited 
campaign 
contributions 
 
4.83 (1.43) 68.92 (25.51) .43*** .32 .52 
Nuclear energy 
use 
 
4.42 (1.59) 72.44 (27.58) .60*** .52 .67 
Genetically 
modified food 
 
4.26 (1.50) 65.20 (27.41) .55*** .46 .63 
American 
military 
operations 
overseas 
 
4.18 (1.42) 66.31 (24.03) .25** .13 .36 
Oil and coal 
energy use 4.03 (1.26) 78.13 (19.43) .31*** .20 .42 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
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Table 3. Study 1 descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between composite moral 
judgment and social risk estimate for each political threat. 
Political Threat 
Mean Moral 
Judgments 
(SD) 
Mean Social 
Risk Estimate 
(SD) 
r 
95% Confidence Intervals 
Lower Limit Upper Limit 
Decision to end 
a pregnancy 
 
3.62 (1.85) 77.13 (19.56) .15^ .03 .27 
Restrictive gun 
laws 
 
3.00 (1.67) 52.67 (27.81) .08 -.05 .20 
Safe 
homosexual sex 
 
2.62 (1.86) 62.13 (27.97) .07 -.05 .19 
Crossing your 
country’s 
border illegally 
 
3.76 (1.65) 65.34 (26.10) -.04 -.16 .09 
Legalizing 
recreational 
marijuana 
 
3.35 (1.90) 59.25 (30.04) .20^ .08 .32 
Unlimited 
campaign 
contributions 
 
4.83 (1.43) 60.49 (24.52) .09 -.03 .21 
Nuclear energy 
use 
 
4.42 (1.59) 60.71 (27.45) .47*** .37 .56 
Genetically 
modified food 
 
4.26 (1.50) 54.17 (25.87) .27*** .15 .38 
American 
military 
operations 
overseas 
 
4.18 (1.42) 51.51 (28.43) -.001 -.13 .13 
Oil and coal 
energy use 4.03 (1.26) 52.02 (29.12) .13^ .01 .25 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons; ^ significant 
before correction 
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Figure 1. Study 1 results illustrated an overall significant correlation between moral 
condemnation and physical risk estimates across the ten political threats. 
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Table 4. Study 1 standardized correlates of overall physical risk estimation (N = 178 )a 
Variable β (95% CI) SE t 
Gender     
    Male (female = 0) -.27 (-.56, .02)† .15 -1.82 
Income -.04 (-.18, .10) .07 -.58 
Political orientationb .12 (-.02, .26)† .07 1.68 
Ethnicity (white = 0)     
    Asian/ Pacific Islander -.65 (-1.04, -.26)** .20 -3.26 
    Black/ African-American -.71 (-1.79, .38) .55 -1.29 
    Hispanic -.26 (-.59, .08) .17 -1.53 
    Other -.46 (-.94, .02)† .24 -1.88 
Religiosity -.04 (-.26, .18) .11 -.39 
Belief in a god or gods .12 (-.09, .34) .11 1.11 
Media Use     
    Traditional (e.g., TV, radio) .05 (-.09, .19) .07 .76 
    Social (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) .03 (-.11, .17) .07 .43 
Moral judgmentc .33 (.18, .48)*** .08 4.39 
Intercept .33 (.10, .56)** .12 2.78 
Model statistics F(12, 165) = 4.38, p < .001; R2 = .24 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; aN varies from total sample size due to missing data; 
bAveraged between social and economic political orientation scores, higher score = more 
conservative; cHigher = more immoral 
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Table 5. Study 2 descriptive statistics of moral judgments and risk estimates, and independent-samples t-
tests between conditions for moral judgments and Likert-scale risk estimates for each vignette. 
 Moral Judgment Risk Estimate Bet Amount ($) 
Vignette Mean (SD) t 95%  CI Mean (SD) t 
95% 
CI Mean (SD) t 
95% 
CI 
 Unint. Int.   Unint. Int.   Uint. Int.   
Flight 2.97 
(1.28) 
5.24 
(1.43) 
-18.92 -2.51, 
-2.04 
*** 
3.82 
(2.09) 
4.03 
(2.10) 
-1.16 -.57, 
.15 
6.11 
(7.03) 
5.49 
(6.26) 
1.32 -.30, 
1.53 
Quarter 3.68 
(.93) 
6.08 
(1.03) 
-24.80 -2.59, 
-2.21 
*** 
2.59 
(1.64) 
3.29 
(1.85) 
-4.46 -1.01, 
-.39 
*** 
5.53 
(6.23) 
5.72 
(6.43) 
-.43 -1.06, 
.68 
Expired 
food 
3.83 
(1.40) 
5.98 
(1.15) 
-17.96 -2.38, 
-1.91 
*** 
3.47 
(1.89) 
3.98 
(1.96) 
-3.01 -.83, 
-.17 
** 
6.02 
(6.86) 
6.50 
(7.64) 
-.93 -1.48, 
.53 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons; Uint. = unintentional 
condition; Int. = intentional condition; CI = confidence intervals 
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Figure 2. Results from study 2 showing that actions committed intentionally were seen as more 
immoral and riskier than the same actions unintentionally committed. Bars represent standard 
error. 
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Figure 3. Study 3 manipulation check results showing mean moral judgment across the three 
conditions (good, ambiguous, bad) for each of the six vignettes. Bars represent standard error. 
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Table 6. Study 3 ANOVA and Tukey HSD results for moral judgments of each vignette. 
Vignette F-value (df) Difference between means (95% CI) 
  Good – Ambig. Bad – Ambig. Good – Bad 
Medicine 310.20***  
(2 ,575) 
-.01 
(-.32, .31) 
2.97*** 
(2.65, 3.29) 
2.97*** 
(2.64, 3.29) 
Broken car 114.30*** 
(2, 579) 
.50** 
(.19, .81) 
1.37*** 
(1.07, 1.68) 
1.88*** 
(1.57, 2.18) 
Expired food 87.11*** 
(2, 578) 
-.23 
(-.53, .06) 
1.63*** 
(1.31, 1.94) 
1.39*** 
(1.09, 1.70) 
Yellow light 6.22** 
(2, 574) 
.37* 
(.05, .70) 
.08 
(-.23, .39) 
.45* 
(.14, .77) 
Train crossing 20.10*** 
(2, 570) 
.18 
(-.13, .49) 
.64*** 
(.32, .95) 
.82*** 
(.50, 1.13) 
Quarter 415*** 
(2, 571) 
.82*** 
(.56, 1.08) 
2.44*** 
(2.17, 2.72) 
3.26*** 
(2.99, 3.54) 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 4. Study 3 results showing mean risk estimates across the three conditions (good, 
ambiguous, bad) for each of the six vignettes. Bars represent standard error. 
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Table 7. Study 3 ANOVA and Tukey HSD results for risk estimates of each vignette. 
Vignette F-value (df) Difference between means (95% CI) 
  Good – Ambig. Bad – Ambig. Good – Bad 
Medicine 12.21*** 
(2, 578) 
3.86 
(-1.33, 9.04) 
7.19** 
(1.91, 12.47) 
11.05*** 
(5.73, 16.37) 
Broken car 2.50† 
(2, 580) 
2.39 
(-4.09, 8.97) 
3.68 
(-2.73, 10.10) 
6.07† 
(-.39, 12.53) 
Expired food 4.38* 
(2, 579) 
4.37 
(-1.31, 10.04) 
2.83 
(-3.15, 8.80) 
7.19** 
(1.38, 13) 
Yellow light 3.70* 
(2,574) 
-.67 
(-6.43, 5.09) 
5.85* 
(.33, 11.37) 
5.18† 
(-.50, 10.86) 
Train crossing .93 
(2, 572) 
-.96 
(-7.40, 548) 
2.73 
(-3.82, 9.28) 
3.69 
(-2.86, 10.24) 
Quarter 13.93*** 
2, 576) 
.27 
(-4.92, 5.45) 
10.51*** 
(5.15, 15.88) 
10.78*** 
(5.34, 16.22) 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Appendix 
Study 1 
Study 1 participant demographic characteristics (N = 277)   
Variable Percent (%) Mean Std. Dev. 
Gender    
    Female 63.54   
    Male 36.10   
    Other 0.36   
Age    
    18-21 82.54   
    22-25 13.10   
    26-30 2.38   
    31-40 1.98   
Ethnicity    
    Asian/ Pacific-Islander 42.39   
    Black/ African-American 2.17   
    Hispanic 30.80   
    White 16.30   
    Other 8.34   
Political Party    
    Democrat 52.19   
    Republican 5.84   
    Libertarian 2.55   
    Other 1.83   
    No party affiliation 37.59   
Religious Affiliation    
    Agnostic 16.30   
    Atheist 11.85   
    Buddhist 7.80   
    Christian (Catholic) 27.80   
    Christian (Protestant) 11.44   
    Christian (Other) 13.70   
    Hindu 1.85   
    Jewish 0.00   
    Muslim 2.96   
    Other 6.30   
Political Orientationa    
    Social  3.00 1.64 
    Economic  3.43 1.57 
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Religiosityb  3.28 2.14 
Belief in a god or godsc  4.48 2.49 
Incomed  3.39 2.39 
aHigher = more conservative;  bHigher = more religious; cHigher = more belief in a god or gods;  dIncome 
was measured in seven $20,000 intervals from $0 – 19,999 to $120,000 or higher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 1 threats and physical risk questions. 
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Threat 
 
Physical Risk Question 
 
Decision to end a pregnancy 
 
What is the likelihood that a woman who 
decides to end her pregnancy will have 
subsequent mental or physical health issues? 
 
Restrictive gun laws 
 
What is the likelihood that restrictive gun 
laws will decrease the number of gun related 
injuries? (r) 
 
Safe homosexual sex 
 
What is the likelihood of contracting a 
sexually transmitted disease from protected 
homosexual sex? 
 
Crossing your country’s border illegally 
 
What is the likelihood that someone who 
crossed your country’s border illegally is a 
violent criminal? 
 
Legalizing recreational marijuana (α = .81) 
 
What is the likelihood that using recreational 
marijuana will cause physical harm to the 
user? 
 
What is the likelihood that legalizing 
recreational marijuana will lead to an increase 
in other “hard” drug use? 
 
Unlimited campaign contributions 
 
What is the likelihood that lifted corporate 
environmental regulations can negatively 
influence your health? 
 
Nuclear energy use 
 
What is the likelihood that using nuclear 
energy can cause a significant disaster? 
 
Genetically modified food 
 
What is the likelihood that consuming 
genetically modified food can cause physical 
health issues? 
 
American military operations 
 
What is the likelihood that American military 
operations overseas can lead to a terrorist 
attack on American soil? 
 
Oil and coal use for energy (α = .76) 
 
What is the likelihood that using oil and coal 
for energy can lead to global climate change? 
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What is the likelihood that global climate 
change can directly impact health? 
r = reverse coded 
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Study 1 threats and social risk questions. 
 
Threat 
 
Social Risk Question 
 
Decision to end a pregnancy 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for deciding to end a 
pregnancy? 
 
Restrictive gun laws 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for supporting restrictive 
gun laws? 
 
Safe homosexual sex 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for having safe 
homosexual sex? 
 
Crossing your country’s border illegally 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for crossing your 
country’s border illegally? 
 
Legalizing recreational marijuana 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for using recreational 
marijuana? 
 
Unlimited campaign contributions 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for supporting unlimited 
political campaign contributions? 
 
Nuclear energy use 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for supporting the use of 
nuclear energy? 
 
Genetically modified food 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for supporting genetically 
modified food? 
 
American military operations 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for supporting American 
military operations overseas? 
 
Oil and coal use for energy 
 
What is the likelihood of being negatively 
evaluated by others for using oil and coal for 
energy? 
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Study 2 
Study 2 participant demographic characteristics (N = 410)   
Variable Percent (%) Mean Std. Dev. 
Gender    
    Female 40.35   
    Male 58.66   
    Other 0.99   
Ethnicity    
    Asian/ Pacific-Islander 77.97   
    Black/ African-American 9.16   
    Hispanic/ LatinX 3.96   
    Middle Eastern 4.21   
    Multiracial 0.50   
    Native American/ Indigenous    
    Peoples 
0.74   
    White 0.50   
    Other 2.96   
Political Party    
    Democrat 47.52   
    Republican 3.96   
    Libertarian 23.02   
    Other 3.72   
    No party affiliation 21.78   
Religious Affiliation    
    Agnostic 21.73   
    Atheist 15.06   
    Buddhist 1.48   
    Christian (Catholic) 17.04   
    Christian (Protestant) 22.47   
    Christian (Other) 9.38   
    Hindu 2.47   
    Muslim 1.23   
    Other 9.14   
Age  39.80 14.43 
Incomea  3.21 1.81 
SESb  4.46 1.76 
Political Orientation    
    Social  3.39 2.01 
    Economic  3.79 2.05 
Religiosity  3.22 2.47 
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Belief in a god or gods  4.29 2.75 
Free will belief  5.93 1.23 
Karma belief  4.45 2.33 
Media hours per day    
     Traditional (TV, radio, etc.)  3.03 1.76 
     Social  2.23 1.48 
aIncome was measured in seven $20,000 intervals from $0 – 19,999 to $120,000 or higher; bSocio-economic 
status was measured using the MacArthur Subjective Status Scale in which participants place themselves on 
an 11-rung ladder representing society, where higher numbers indicate more educated, better jobs, and more 
respected, and lower numbers indicate less educated, worse or no jobs, and less respected. 
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Study 3 
Study 3 participant demographic characteristics (N = 595)   
Variable Percent (%) Mean Std. Dev. 
Gender    
    Female 37.18   
    Male 62.82   
Education    
    Currently in high school 7.34   
    Some high school 0.56   
    Completed high school 3.39   
    Currently in college/  
    university 
25.24   
    Some college/ university 8.47   
    Completed college/ university 21.85   
    Currently in graduate/  
    professional school 
6.21   
    Some graduate/ professional 
    school 
5.65   
    Completed graduate/ 
    professional school 
21.28   
Political Orientation    
    Conservative 18.84   
    Libertarian 12.50   
    Moderate 14.13   
    Liberal 47.83   
    Other 2.54   
    Don’t know/ not political 4.16   
Age  35.17 15.76 
SESa  6.38 1.99 
Political Orientation    
    Social    
    Economic    
Religiosity  2.64 2.13 
Belief in a god or gods  3.28 2.66 
Media hours per day    
     Traditional (TV, radio, etc.)  2.09 1.32 
     Social  2.26 1.53 
aSocio-economic status was measured using the MacArthur Subjective Status Scale in which participants 
place themselves on an 11-rung ladder representing society, where higher numbers indicate more educated, 
better jobs, and more respected, and lower numbers indicate less educated, worse or no jobs, and less 
respected. 
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Study 3 vignettes and risk questions. 
Vignette Good Intention Unintentional Bad Intention Risk Question 
Medicine Jane has a chronic 
illness. At her most 
recent visit to her 
doctor, Jane was 
prescribed a new drug 
that is still in clinical 
trials and has unknown 
side effects. The 
doctor wrote the 
prescription because 
he thinks it is the best 
option for her. 
Jane has a chronic 
illness. At her most 
recent visit to her 
doctor, Jane was 
prescribed a new drug 
that is still in clinical 
trials and has unknown 
side effects. 
Jane has a chronic 
illness. At her most 
recent visit to her 
doctor, Jane was 
prescribed a new drug 
that is still in clinical 
trials and has unknown 
side effects. The 
doctor wrote the 
prescription because 
he thinks it will win 
him favor for an 
executive position at 
the drug’s company.  
 
What is the 
likelihood Jane will 
have an adverse 
reaction to the new 
drug? 
Broken 
car 
Sean is a father with 
three kids who he 
drives to school every 
day.  Noticing his car 
was acting up recently, 
he took it into a 
mechanic. The 
mechanic told him 
there is a serious issue 
with the car that may 
cause him to lose 
control of it.  A week 
later, the car still 
hasn’t been fixed 
because Sean has been 
working overtime to 
be able to afford the 
repairs. 
 
Sean is a father with 
three kids who he 
drives to school every 
day.  Noticing his car 
was acting up recently, 
he took it into a 
mechanic. The 
mechanic told him 
there is a serious issue 
with the car that may 
cause him to lose 
control of it.  A week 
later, the car still hasn’t 
been fixed because the 
shop was closed all 
week and it is the only 
one that can do the job. 
Sean is a father with 
three kids who he 
drives to school every 
day.  Noticing his car 
was acting up recently, 
he took it into a 
mechanic. The 
mechanic told him 
there is a serious issue 
with the car that may 
cause him to lose 
control of it.  A week 
later, the car still 
hasn’t been fixed 
because Sean is lazy 
and doesn’t care to get 
it fixed quickly. 
     
What is the 
likelihood Sean's kids 
will be injured in car 
accident on their way 
to school? 
Expired 
food 
Jasmine was invited to 
attend a company 
dinner party tonight 
with her co-workers 
and is rushing to get 
ready. Each employee 
was asked to bring 
their own dessert to 
share. After finding a 
recipe online, Jasmine 
decided to make a 
custard pie. While 
making the custard, 
she noticed that the 
milk she used is past 
its expiration date. 
Since there is no time 
to fix it and she 
doesn’t want to show 
up empty-handed, she 
Jasmine was invited to 
attend a company 
dinner party tonight 
with her co-workers 
and is rushing to get 
ready. Each employee 
was asked to bring 
their own dessert to 
share. After finding a 
recipe online, Jasmine 
decided to make a 
custard pie. While 
making the custard, she 
unknowingly used milk 
that is past its 
expiration date. She 
brings the pie with her 
and a few people eat it.  
  
Jasmine was invited to 
attend a company 
dinner party tonight 
with her co-workers 
and is rushing to get 
ready. Each employee 
was asked to bring 
their own dessert to 
share. After finding a 
recipe online, Jasmine 
decided to make a 
custard pie. While 
making the custard, 
she noticed that the 
milk she used is past 
its expiration date. 
Since she doesn’t like 
her job and finds her 
co-workers annoying, 
she brings the pie with 
What is the 
likelihood that one of 
Jasmine’s co-workers 
who ate the pie will 
get sick from it? 
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brings the pie with her 
and forewarns her co-
workers about the 
spoiled milk. A few 
people eat it.  
  
her and does not tell 
anyone about the 
spoiled milk. A few 
people eat it. 
    
Yellow 
light 
After getting off of 
work, John realizes 
that he left his wife’s 
unwrapped 
anniversary present on 
the kitchen table at 
home.  Rushing to get 
there before his wife 
does, he drives through 
multiple yellow lights 
on the way.  
  
After getting off of 
work, John rushes to 
get home and drives 
through multiple 
yellow lights on the 
way. 
  
After getting off of 
work, John realizes 
that he left his bag of 
cocaine on the kitchen 
table at home.  
Rushing to get there 
before his wife and 
kids do, he drives 
through multiple 
yellow lights on the 
way. 
    
What is the 
likelihood John will 
be in a car accident 
on his way home? 
Train 
crossing 
Bill is in a hurry to 
finish his morning run 
so that he can make it 
to the soup kitchen in 
time to serve lunch to 
the homeless.  As he 
approaches a rail road 
crossing he sees the 
arms coming down, 
signaling an oncoming 
freight train. Not 
wanting to wait, he 
decides to dash across 
the tracks. 
  
Bill is in a hurry to 
finish his morning run. 
As he approaches a rail 
road crossing he sees 
the arms coming down, 
signaling an oncoming 
freight train. Not 
wanting to wait, he 
decides to dash across 
the tracks. 
  
Bill is in a hurry to 
finish his morning run 
so that he can meet 
with a prostitute while 
his wife it out doing 
errands. As he 
approaches a rail road 
crossing he sees the 
arms coming down, 
signaling an oncoming 
freight train. Not 
wanting to wait, he 
decides to dash across 
the tracks. 
     
What is the 
likelihood Bill will be 
hit by the train? 
Quarter Jason is at an 
amusement park and 
decides to go on the 
Freefall Ride. Before 
he gets on, the staff 
ask all riders to 
remove loose items 
from their pockets. As 
the ride reaches the 
top, Jason realizes 
there is a quarter in his 
shirt pocket.  He tries 
his best to hold on to 
it, but it still flies out 
of his hand as the ride 
drops. 
  
Jason is at an 
amusement park and 
decides to go on the 
Freefall Ride. Before 
he gets on, the staff ask 
all riders to remove 
loose items from their 
pockets. As the ride 
reaches the top, Jason 
doesn&#8217;t realize 
he forgot to take a 
quarter out of his shirt 
pocket.  The quarter 
flies out of his pocket 
as the ride drops. 
  
Jason is at an 
amusement park and 
decides to go on the 
Freefall Ride. Before 
he gets on, the staff 
ask all riders to 
remove loose items 
from their pockets. As 
the ride reaches the 
top, Jason realizes 
there is a quarter in his 
shirt pocket.  Thinking 
it would be funny to 
hit someone in the 
head, he throws the 
quarter out of his 
pocket as the ride 
drops. 
    
What is the 
likelihood someone 
walking near the 
Freefall Ride will be 
hit by the quarter? 
 
